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Introduction
In a 1992 tour de force, the FAO Fisheries Department summarized the state of the
world’s commercial fisheries with the comment that:
Economic waste has reached major proportions; there has been a general increase in
resource depletion, as fishing effort has moved down the food chain; the marine en-
vironment has become increasingly degraded; conflicts have become more wide-
spread; and the plight of the small-scale fishermen has intensified (FAO Fisheries
Department, p. 52).
As if to underscore the point, in July of that year the Canadian Minister of Fisheries
and Oceans declared a two-year moratorium on the northern cod stock of Newfound-
land, one of the world’s great fisheries and traditional supplier of 10% of the world’s
Atlantic cod. It is now seven years later and the fishery was opened in a limited way
during the summer of 1999. Stock failures have since led to a host of fishing clo-
sures and partial closures, most notably of U.S. groundfish in areas of the Georges
Bank. Perusal of the FAO’s chartbook on trends and catches since 1970 shows that
many of the world’s major commercial catches, particularly of demersal species,
have shown a secular decline during the past quarter century (Stamatopolous 1993).
The point has been emphasized in a more recent FAO document noting:
Many of the resources classified as overexploited in 1992 have been showing de-
creasing yields for the last twenty years. Together, these resources are now produc-
ing 6 million tonnes less than they did in 1985 and about the same as they produced
in the mid-1960s when fishing effort was undoubtedly much less than it is now
(Grainger and Garcia 1996, p. 11).
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The authors point out that even this loss, out of a current world marine catch of 84
million metric tons, is seriously understated.
After years of fishery management, these are disappointing conclusions. Two in-
tellectual responses have been engendered by these facts. The first is a renewed and
accelerating interest in the privatization of commercial marine fisheries through the
introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs)(Committee to Review Indi-
vidual Fishing Quotas 1999). The second is a concern for subsidies, the subject of
this paper. In its 1992 report, the FAO argued that the necessary first step in stop-
ping the depletion of fisheries would be the removal of subsidies “which exacerbate
the waste and increase the impediments to change” (FAO Fisheries Department
1992, p. 54). Never a neglected subject, fisheries subsidies have recently stimulated
an enormous literature, with concern expressed and analysis performed by govern-
mental agencies (Congressional Research Service 1995; Commonwealth of Australia
1996); intergovernmental agencies (World Bank: Milazzo 1998; OECD: Steenblik
1998 and Steenblik and Munro 1998); nongovernmental agencies (World Wildlife
Fund: Burns 1997); and individual scholars (Stone 1997).
As a basic operational concept, subsidies are generally viewed as occurring
“when the government through its actions enables producers of goods and services
to avoid full payment for the factors of production and/or to behave differently in
the marketplace than they would otherwise” (Schanz 1986, CRS-1). The opening
substantive comments in the 1995 OECD report on environmental subsidies illus-
trate the frequent close association of subsidies with international trade:
The first agenda item dealt with the problem of defining environmental subsidies
and distinguishing among them on the basis of their trade-distorting potential
(Pearson 1995, p. 5).
This paper considers the concept of subsidies in the context of fisheries policies.
Since a major theme in discussions of fisheries management is the role of govern-
ment in the decline of commercial fisheries, we ultimately return to the second part
of Schanz’ definition. What is needed is an approach that goes beyond questions of
international trade, because trade pressure is only a small part of the problem of
fisheries management.1 The objective of this paper is to define subsidies so the term
adequately encompasses the effects of government in stimulating businesses “to be-
have differently in the marketplace than they would otherwise.”
In everyday parlance, a subsidy is the granting of money to an individual or
firm by the government.2 Presumably, the grant serves what is seen as a useful pub-
1 Much of the impetus for development of measures to more fully quantify subsidies is founded on the
need to compare the level of agricultural subsidies across nations for the purpose of trade negotiations.
Measures often employed for this purpose are: (i) the Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE,
CSE), and (ii) the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The PSE and its counterpart the CSE are broadly
defined aggregate measures of support which, in the case of PSE, includes direct payments to producers fi-
nanced by budgetary outlays, budgetary outlays for certain other programs assumed to provide benefits to
producers (e.g., research, inspection, and environmental policies), and the value of revenue transfers from
consumers to producers as a result of policies that distort market prices. The CSE provides a measure of di-
rect and indirect government expenditures provided to consumers of a given commodity. The AMS, designed
during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations as part of an effort to obtain commitments from member
countries to reduce domestic support for agriculture, differs from the broader PSE by excluding esti-
mated benefits (costs) of certain non-commodity specific policies (e.g., research, inspection, and envi-
ronmental policies) and by using special WTO-defined measures of deficiency payments and market
price supports (see Nelson 1997). To date, the concepts have not been applied successfully to fisheries.
2 Firms can also cross-subsidize operations; a vertically integrated fish processing-harvesting firm might
use processing sector profits to offset harvesting losses. Such subsidies are independent of government
and are, therefore, not considered in this paper.Thalassorama 153
lic purpose. For instance, were a government to desire to increase the nation’s fish-
ing capacity, the government might pay a “boat bounty,” or subsidy, of, say, 30% of
the cost of fishing vessels. By reducing the cost to the boat owner, a purchase that
might not otherwise have been profitable may become profitable and the purchase
made. Dictionaries tend to restrict their definitions to subsidies of this type.3
Yet, the range of possible subsidies is much broader than this. In a popular pub-
lic finance textbook, Groves (1945, pp. 331–34) considered a different kind of sub-
sidy. Although automobile sales have never been directly subsidized in the U.S.,
roads have generally been built with government funds. In the absence of user
charges, a subsidy is being provided to the owner of the vehicle, since the full cost
of operating the vehicle is not being borne by its user. Individual states, as early as
1901, charged motor vehicle registration fees, and starting in 1919, individual states
collected gasoline taxes. If these and similar fees and taxes do not cover the full cost
of building and maintaining the roads, the infrastructure expenditure includes a sub-
sidy component. The improved infrastructure, especially when combined with subsi-
dized costs, leads to increased use of roads through increased capitalization (the pur-
chase of cars and trucks). The analogy to fisheries, where excess capacity is a
chronic problem, is obvious.
Subsidies: Implemented for a Purpose—Not Necessarily Evil
Any subsidy is introduced for a purpose. From different perspectives, the subsidy
might be considered to be “good” or “bad.” If the subsidy accomplishes a univer-
sally desired goal, then society would rate it as good. However, there are always dis-
tributional effects associated with any subsidy, whereby some sectors of the
economy are favored over others. In a more recent public sector economics textbook for
instance, Stiglitz (1986, pp. 184–97) discusses the environmental problem of pollution
abatement. Firms, such as steel producers, operate factories that pollute. Governments,
increasingly concerned about the impact of pollution, have adopted a number of
methods to control pollution, including the subsidization of firms for the purchase
and installation of pollution abatement equipment. While the policy achieves the so-
cially desirable objective of reducing pollution, an argument could be made that, in
addition to helping clean the air, taxpayers are subsidizing the private profits of the
polluting industry, thereby resulting in a redistribution of income from the general
public to the steel industry. Such distributional effects tend to be controversial.4
An example directly relating to fisheries is the subsidization of sewage treat-
ment on commercial fishing boats. While superficially this would achieve a (pre-
sumed) societal goal of helping to protect the marine environment, it would also
tend to distort costs to the individual fishing firm and, hence, its profit maximizing
potential and related level of output. One might even ask whether an industry that
cannot pay for its own sewage treatment is worth supporting.5 The question of
“good” versus “bad” subsidies can be a complicated one. Regardless of the current
connotations of the word “subsidy,” each government program falling within our ru-
bric “subsidy” must be evaluated on its own merits. Some will be seen as worthwhile;
3 For instance, Webster’s Dictionary (1963, p. 876) defines subsidy as, “a grant by a government to a
private person or company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public.”
4 The complexity of these issues is illustrated by the possibility that subsidies which reduce costs to
firms in the pollution generating industry may actually result in increased pollution levels due to expan-
sion of existing firms and entry of new firms.
5 Some may argue that most land-based enterprises are also not responsible for treating their own sew-
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i.e., the provision of beneficial “public goods,” others less so. Since subsidies are con-
troversial, and the term itself has come to be pejorative, we must emphasize this last
point. Subsidies are not necessarily “evil.” Some subsidies can serve a useful social pur-
pose, such as those which further the preeminent social goal of improving human
safety. Others, however, may contribute only marginally or even detract from the
stated or implied social goal.6 Furthermore, some fishery related subsidies, which
may have served a useful social purpose when implemented, may no longer do so
because of a change in the structure of the fishing industry (e.g., from undercapital-
ized to overcapitalized), a change in the collective social goals, or some amalgam
thereof. If the goals of society can be ascertained, the individual “subsidy” can be
evaluated in the context of whether it moves society closer to its achievement.
Some subsidies involve the allocation of government funds directly to the im-
mediate beneficiary. There are, however, other government programs which do not
necessarily entail direct payments being made, that can also have a real or potential
impact on the profit maximizing level of output of firms. Direct government pay-
ments to the fishing industry for capital expenditures are clearly subsidies. It would
be inadequate, however, to limit our discussion of subsidies to ones of this nature.
How far from these direct payments must we look to cover the ground? To deter-
mine this “distance,” it would be useful first to establish a working definition of
subsidies.
Subsidies, or Expenditures in the Public Trust
There are alternative ways of looking at activities that we denote as subsidies. Since
marine fish are “owned” by the public, i.e., are a public good, the state has a fidu-
ciary responsibility, a public trust, to protect the resource. The costs of science and
enforcement (and management as well) are necessary governmental expenditures in
pursuing this public trust. As such, they are not necessarily subsidies.7 We only men-
tion this approach here without pursuing it further, because, carried to an extreme,
there would be no subsidies, only expenses in support of the public trust. While the dif-
ference may constitute an important philosophical point, and certainly reflects strongly
on one’s attitude towards government activities, for purposes of this analysis, we have
intentionally focused on a more restrictive, but functional, definition of subsidies,
which is formally presented below. Whether or not the subsidies serve a “public
trust” function is an important question but immaterial in the current context.
A Historical and Legal Note
Subsidies of the sort conceptualized in the standard dictionary definition have a
long, and not very controversial, history in the U.S. During the late eighteenth cen-
tury, when the Constitution was being framed, it was understood and accepted that
individual states subsidized industries within their borders. However, taxes that of-
fered preference to within-state industry were anathema. The Commerce clause of
the Constitution was intended to abolish such tariffs, and the U.S. Supreme Court
has always ruled as unconstitutional preferential taxes and tax rebates that favor in-
6 Those that contribute only marginally may still be considered beneficial if the costs involved are small.
Those that detract from social goals would rarely be considered beneficial, even in the absence of any
direct government expenditures.
7 To help clarify this point, the government would clearly have an interest in supporting scientific en-
deavors that help carry out its public trust responsibilities.Thalassorama 155
state business to the detriment of out-of-state business. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has continually upheld the constitutionality of grants of money (subsidies in
the dictionary sense) which favor in-state business over out-of-state business
(Coenen 1998, pp. 979–85).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between the economic effects of
the constitutional and unconstitutional forms of subsidies. Both are either revenue
enhancing or cost diminishing—profit increasing—and the anticipated response of a
firm is identical. For our functional analysis, determining the effects of government
policy on fishing capacity, both types of subsidies must be considered, so the legal
framework is of no help in our search for a working definition of “subsidy.”
Criteria for Defining Subsidies
To define “subsidy” in a manner that would be useful for our purposes, it would be
helpful to review alternative criteria that could form the basis of the definition.
Three criteria: (i) modification of market failures, (ii) cost reduction, and (iii) rev-
enue enhancement, are proposed, discussed, and found wanting.
One criterion that could potentially be used in defining a subsidy is based on the
concept of market failures.8 One could establish an ideal case, for instance, perfect
competition, as a basis for determining the degree to which government programs
help to distort or correct the operation of the market. Problems with this criterion
are twofold. First, there is the problem of establishing the perfectly competitive
norm in the pervasive presence of market failures. Second, even if the competitive
norm could be established, one must then also be able to isolate the specific distort-
ing (or correcting) effects of government programs. A program, such as a lower-
than-commercial interest rate loan program, might be undertaken by government to
correct market failure caused by, say, incomplete information in the private sector.9
One might interpret such a loan program as a “good” subsidy, but it is difficult to
see how it could be excluded from a general definition of “subsidy.” Surely such a
loan program, if targeted at a fishery, even if it served to correct a market imperfec-
tion, would be subject to a legitimate claim for a countervailing duty by a fish im-
porting country. Who is to judge whether the higher commercial loan rate or the
lower government rate more adequately reflects the rates that would exist in a “per-
fect” market? In his economic analysis of the different effects of government loans,
loan guarantees, and grants on firms, Li (1999, p. 25) denies the possibility that the
government can ever correct a market failure, since, in his opinion, “the government
does not have information or technology advantage over private agents.”
There is yet another consideration to be taken into account. According to the
8 Panayotou (1993) defines market failures as institutional failures attributable partially to the nature of
certain resources and partially the failure of the government to (a) establish the fundamental conditions
for markets to function efficiently (such as property rights and the enforcement of contracts) and (b) use
the instruments at its disposal (such as taxation, regulation, public investment, and macroeconomic
policy) to bring costs and benefits that the institutional framework fails to internalize into the domain of
markets.
9 Dewar (1983, p. 67) notes that the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 authorized loans for replacement, re-
pair, and operation of fishing vessels when vessel owners could not obtain commercial loans. Congress,
acting on the belief that fisheries were undercapitalized, authorized loans to vessel owners at
unsubsidized market interest rates but with beneficial repayment terms. Dewar concludes that Congress
believed that banks were overestimating the risks of loans to vessel owners. In passing, however, it
might be noted that if the conclusion by Congress was erroneous (i.e., the banks’ interest rate and repay-
ment schedule did accurately reflect the risks involved in fishing operations), then government interven-
tion would increase, not correct, market distortions.Schrank and Keithly 156
theory of the second best (Meade 1955, pp. 102–18), when there is a number of mar-
ket imperfections, correcting only a subset does not ensure movement of the system
closer to the ideal, and may even move it away. Thus, to continue with our example,
a government ostensibly correcting loan conditions, leaving all other imperfections
intact, may actually move the system further away from the conditions of a perfect
market.10
A second criterion that could potentially be used in defining a subsidy is based
on the concept of costs to the firm. Specifically, any government program that re-
duces the firm’s costs, either implicitly or explicitly, serves to increase its profits. In
the long-run, such a program would stimulate the use of additional inputs and, with
some rare exceptions, output.
A third criterion would be revenues. As with the second criterion, any govern-
ment program (e.g., a price support program) that serves to increase revenues would
stimulate profits and, again, with some notable exceptions, output.
Subsidies affecting either revenues or costs, or which modify market imperfec-
tions (and as a result affect revenues or costs), affect, at least potentially, the firm’s
profits. Therefore, in evaluating a subsidy, a suitable all-encompassing framework is
provided if we determine the potential effect of the government program on the
profits of the firm.
A Tentative Definition of “Subsidy”
Based on the previous discussion, a subsidy can tentatively be defined as any gov-
ernment program that potentially permits the firm to increase its profits beyond what
they would have been in the absence of the government program. It should be noted
that anything that increases the profits of a firm presumably increases government
tax revenues and, therefore, decreases the net government financial outlay for the
subsidy. To accurately compute the amount of the net subsidies, it is necessary to
take these counterbalancing taxes into account. This factor is of little relevance at
low marginal tax rates but becomes more so as the rate increases, and it is not given
further consideration in this paper.
Profits are the result of economic activity by a firm. Assuming that the firm is
functioning within an unchanging form of industrial organization and an event oc-
curs that increases anticipated profits, the firm has an incentive to further enhance
its profits by increasing its level of economic activity. Once a decision is made to
expand output, if the firm is operating at or near full capacity, the decision to ex-
pand output must be made in conjunction with the long-term decision to expand ca-
pacity.11 In the case of fisheries, capacity would be expanded by increasing the num-
ber or capacity of fishing vessels and fish processing plants.12 Thus, we shall assume
that a subsidy which, by our tentative definition, potentially leads to an increase in
profits, leads also to an increase in capacity.
10 As noted by Panayotou (1993), government policies introduced for the purpose of correcting a market
failure often tend to introduce additional distortions in the market for natural resources. As such, a mar-
ket failure by itself, is not a sufficient condition for government intervention. Specifically, government
intervention is warranted only if (i) the intervention outperforms the market or improves on its perfor-
mance and (ii) benefits of intervention exceed costs, including indirect and unintended costs of distor-
tions introduced via intervention in a given market.
11 The firm’s definition of capacity is flexible. A fisherman or fishing firm may consider full employ-
ment of a vessel as occurring when the vessel is used at only 50% of its physical capacity.
12 Excess plant capacity can, in turn, lead to changes in harvesting capacity and pressure on fish stocks
as owners attempt to utilize their capital and as workers seek employment.Thalassorama 157
Subsidies Increase Profits with Respect to What?
Since we are defining subsidies in terms of potential changes in profits, the question
arises, “Changes with respect to what?” Perhaps the most obvious answer is changes
from the situation that would exist under the theoretical considerations of perfect
competition. The primary difficulty referred to earlier, is that this is a theoretical
construct that cannot exist in many cases; thus, as a criterion, it is too amorphous to
serve as an operational concept. Even when perfect competition could exist, infor-
mation requirements necessary to determine the norm are liable to be too great to
permit the criterion to be functional.
Rather than use conditions existing under a specific form of industrial organiza-
tion, we prefer an alternative approach roughly analogous to partial equilibrium
analysis. That is, to evaluate a subsidy, assume that we start with the present situa-
tion, the government subsidy program is then invoked, and under the rather stringent
assumption that no other “external” factors change, the potential change in profits,
at least conceptually, can be determined.
Subsidies Increase Profit over What Time Frame?
Some fisheries subsidies might affect profits in the short-term and others in the
long-term. But the long-run creates complications. Take, for example, the Fishery
Vessels Assistance Act of Canada under which, from 1942 to 1986, the federal gov-
ernment paid the owner a bounty for every new fishing vessel built. As a result of
this bounty, the cost of vessels decreased, anticipated profits rose, and more fishing
vessels were built. Since changes in the number or capacity of vessels are changes
in capital, the usual timeframe for the analysis is the long-term. However, that is not
the end of the story. The standard economic theory of open-access fisheries states
that as more vessels are added, the profits (or more properly the rents, but we will
ignore the difference) ultimately will dissipate.13 Thus, the bounty leads to increased
anticipated profits and, therefore, to an increase in fishing capacity, but this increase
in capacity ultimately leads to a reduction in profits. Our immediate concern is the
“impact” effect of the bounty, which is to increase anticipated profits, and not the
ultimate effect. Both the increase in anticipated profits (and for a while an actual in-
crease in profits) and the subsequent reduced profits are caused by changes in the
number of vessels; i.e., changes in capital. Both are long-term changes. It will be
helpful to distinguish between these two aspects of the long-term. In the absence of
a conventional expression in economic theory, we will call the “impact” or interme-
diate effect the “medium-term” and the ultimate effect the long-term. In general, our
focus will be on the medium-term.
Subsidies to Whom?
While much of the discussion to this point has concentrated on subsidies in relation
to the harvesting sector of the fishery, subsidies to other sectors/institutions are also
worth considering. As one specific example, subsidies can be given to the process-
ing/marketing sector of the fishing industry. The issue then becomes whether subsi-
dies to this sector can have an impact on capacity in the harvesting sector. The an-
swer clearly is yes. Consider the situation whereby each of a given number of pro-
13 While this statement is generally true, it should not be interpreted to negate the fact that fleets are
heterogeneous, and some vessels, the “highliners,” will continue to earn profits.Schrank and Keithly 158
cessors in a region generates an identical demand for the raw fish input to be used in
the production process. A subsidy to the processing sector will allow for the entry of
otherwise unprofitable establishments as well as the possible expansion of existing
facilities (assuming the price of the processed product does not respond significantly
to increased production). This expansion, in turn, results in an increase in the aggre-
gate demand for the raw input and a “bidding up” of the price of the raw input. This
“bidding up” process results in an increase in profits in the harvesting sector,
thereby encouraging the expansion of harvesting effort and capacity. Subsidization
of the processing sector, therefore, implies a subsidy to the harvesting sector.
Additional Factors
Additional factors remain to be considered:
(i) Would a government policy that initially increases fishermen’s profits, but in
the long-run simply leads to the dissipation of profits, be a subsidy?
(ii) Would a government action that potentially diminishes profits be a [negative]
subsidy?
(iii) Would global changes, such as monetary policies of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem that serve to alter interest rates, be subsidies?
(iv) Would buyback programs which lead to fewer fishermen be subsidies, and if
so, subsidies to whom?
(v) Could the lack of a government policy constitute a subsidy?
(vi) Can policies restricting access to fisheries be considered subsidies?
(vii) Could a government action that has no immediate effect on the fishery be con-
sidered a subsidy to the fishery?
(viii)Can a subsidy to a nonfishing industry constitute a subsidy to the fishery?
Can a Subsidy Lead to a Dissipation of Profits?
If a government program leads to a rise in profits, there will generally be an increase
in output and, in the long-term, an increase in capacity. According to this argument,
a government policy that initially increases fishermen’s profits, but sets in train a se-
quence of events that leads to a dissipation of those new profits, is considered a sub-
sidy. This apparent conundrum is perfectly consistent with the view often expressed
about the world’s commercial fisheries, that “in the short-term, subsidies produce
additional profits for the fisherman, attract more fishermen into the fishery, and
raise total costs until [profits disappear]” (FAO Fisheries Department 1992, p. 22).
Negative Subsidies
Although the concept of a negative subsidy runs counter to our usual way of think-
ing, it may be useful to consider this concept in some detail. Consistent with our
broad conceptual definition of subsidy, a negative subsidy is simply a government
program that tends to reduce profits.14
14 The concept of a negative subsidy is not without precedent. Webb, Lopez, and Penn (1990, p. 6), sug-
gest that an artificially low domestic farm-gate price for a given product, due, for instance, to a man-
dated price ceiling, would constitute a negative subsidy.Thalassorama 159
Regulatory changes probably constitute the most common and visible type of
negative subsidies. Take, for example, the recently enacted federal regulation that
mandates the use of turtle (or other bycatch) excluder devices as a means of reduc-
ing unintended catch of turtles (or other marine species). Given our tentative defini-
tion, such mandated requirements, to the extent that they result in a loss of catch and
profit in the directed fisheries, would be considered negative subsidies.
As a second example, consider federal regulation that increases the minimum
fish size at harvest or sharply curtails total allowable catch (TAC). Such regulations,
at least in the short-run, also result in reductions in catch and profits and, hence,
constitute negative subsidies to the fishermen.
These examples, from a fisherman’s perspective, are likely to be seen as “bad”
subsidies. But from society’s perspective, can the same conclusions be drawn? With
respect to the first example, when the process of fishing kills turtles (or other
nontargeted species), there exists a negative externality imposed by the fishing in-
dustry upon that segment of society interested in the preservation of turtles (or, more
generally, fishing can impose negative externalities upon user and nonuser groups of
the nontarget resource). From society’s perspective, the negative subsidy imposed
on the fishing industry via mandated bycatch excluder devices may be seen as a way
to offset the negative externality caused by the fishery. To the extent that the regula-
tion is successful in achieving the objective of reducing turtle or other bycatch mor-
tality, the distributional effects associated with a subsidy, as noted earlier, are
clearly evident. Specifically, while negative benefits (i.e., costs and reduced profits)
are imposed on the fishing sector, positive benefits accrue to other sectors of soci-
ety. If the positive benefits accruing to society exceed the negative benefits imposed
on the fishing sector (i.e., negative subsidies), then the policy would assumably
achieve a socially desired objective and would, from the standpoint of society, rep-
resent a “good” subsidy. Hence, while regulations may be considered as “bad” sub-
sidies from the standpoint of the group upon whom they are imposed, from a larger,
societal standpoint, they may be viewed as “good” subsidies.
The problem would be further complicated were the government to offer
payments to fishermen to compensate for the cost of the turtle excluder devices.
In that situation, there would be: (i) a negative externality imposed by the fish-
ery upon that segment of society that values preservation of turtles; (ii) a nega-
tive subsidy imposed by the government on the fishery to compensate for the
negative externality; and (iii) a positive subsidy to compensate for the negative
subsidy. The net subsidy to the fishery (in terms of net anticipated profits)
would be the sum of the positive and negative subsidies. The net social effect
would be the net cost to government of the net subsidy less the social value of
the negative externality. A similar analysis may be used to evaluate government
actions favoring aquaculture which, in turn, affect habitat to the detriment of
commercial fisheries.
Regulations that increase the minimum size at harvest or curtail TAC can be
evaluated in the same context as regulations that mandate bycatch excluder de-
vices. While the fishermen upon whom the regulations are originally imposed
would consider them as “bad” subsidies, the regulations were imposed, presum-
ably, because the long-run benefits associated with imposition of the regula-
tions would exceed costs. The benefits of the regulations may, in the extreme,
accrue only to future generations of fishermen (assuming all future benefits are
not dissipated in an open-access system), while costs are imposed on the cur-
rent generation. Hence, there exists in this case an intergenerational transfer of
subsidies; i.e., a “bad” subsidy to the current generation which results in a
“good” subsidy to future generations.Schrank and Keithly 160
Global Changes
Global changes, such as changes in monetary policies by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem or general changes in tax rates, affect profits in fisheries as well as in all other
industries. As such, government activities resulting in these changes constitute sub-
sidies, according to our broad definition.15
Buyback Programs
Is the payment a government makes to a vessel owner to reduce capacity (as part of
a buyback program) a subsidy? To clarify the argument, let us assume that the pay-
ment is to retire the vessel and gear, as well as any licences owned by the vessel
owner. The vessel owner, therefore, is being paid to leave the industry. This direct pay-
ment constitutes a subsidy to the owner of the vessel being retired only if it is in excess
of the vessel’s fair market value. Assuming that the remainder of the fishing fleet is not
expanded to compensate for the reduction in capacity that results from this payment, the
payment serves to reduce fishing capacity. This is not a subsidy to the fishing fleet, if the
fleet is defined as that which remains after the buyback occurs. It does, however, poten-
tially affect profits, since the productivity of the remaining vessels increases. Had the
government not intervened, profits, at least in the short-term, would have been lower.
Thus, according to our definition, buyback programs are subsidies. This subsidy affects
fishing capacity, but negatively. The current perspective that most commercial fisheries
are overcapitalized implies that subsidies associated with buyback programs are desir-
able because they move society closer to its collective goals. Language regarding re-
building of stocks in the recently enacted Sustainable Fisheries Act supports this view of
buybacks.16 Considering the concerns expressed in this legislation, the need for the
evaluation of subsidies in the context of the social perspective of the times becomes
clear. Given the perceived undercapitalization of the fisheries, such as Dewar sug-
gests existed in the 1950s, and that which existed during the period of the American-
ization program that followed the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976, subsidies
that served to increase fisheries capital were viewed favorably. Now that fisheries
are perceived to be overcapitalized, these subsidies are out of favor, and subsidies
that reverse the previous direction are viewed with approbation.
Can Lack of a Government Program Constitute a Subsidy?
Referring to the steel mill example cited earlier, would the lack of a government
program to prevent pollution constitute a subsidy? In general, government action is
required for there to be a subsidy.17 The exception is a situation where one govern-
15 Treatment of these global changes as subsidies is consistent with the estimation of producer subsidy
equivalents established by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for negotiation purposes under GATT
(see Webb, Lopez, and Penn 1990).
16 It is worth noting, however, that in the absence of policy restricting what may be done with the income
received by a fisherman participating in the buyback program, he/she may simply use the income to purchase
the necessary equipment to enter an alternative fishery. Thus, buyback programs that are limited to a specific
fishery may result in the expansion of capacity in those fisheries not included in the buyback program.
17 All resources, to the extent that they are scarce, are valued by society. Some may, therefore, consider
the steel mill, to the extent that it is using scarce resources but not being charged “fully” for their use, as
receiving a subsidy. Analogous to this, fish stocks in the sea may be considered as assets owned by society.
To the extent that users of the fish stocks are not being charged for the use of these assets, some may argue
that a subsidy is implicitly being given by society at large to the direct users of the resource. This argu-
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ment takes no action while other governments in similar and competitive situations
take action, for instance by charging the costs of certain government operations to
private firms.
Policies Governing Access to Fisheries
Consider the extreme situation of a government which changes its fundamental
fisheries policy from one of completely free access to one of ITQs, where the
quotas are both permanent and set in terms of a percentage of the TAC. Assume
that the ITQs are assigned on the basis of historical catch experience and with-
out substantial charge.18,19 The government has essentially converted a public
good, the fish in the sea, to private capital. Increasing a firm’s capital, free of
charge, is surely a subsidy.20 The firm is willing to participate in this operation
in anticipation of increasing its profits. In addition to the long-run effects of
limiting the access to the fishery of competitors, as in the case of buybacks dis-
cussed above, the recipient of an ITQ might immediately (or later) sell it, the
receipts of which are a capital gain, a form of revenue. Such resource grants
from the government can be made in less dramatic ways than the granting of
permanent ITQs, such as through limiting access or establishing community
quotas. In all cases, they comprise a form of subsidy to the commercial fishing
sector.
Delayed Effects
Many government programs and actions, while not resulting in immediate
changes in profits from commercial fishing activities, will, in the long-run, en-
hance revenues (or decrease costs) to individual firms and, hence, under our
definition constitute subsidies. In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, more than
90% of the species harvested, including the most commercially valuable species
(e.g., shrimp, menhaden, oysters, and blue crabs) are dependent on the region’s
coastal wetlands for at least a portion of their life cycles (Weber, Townsend,
and Bierce 1992). The region, however, and in particular Louisiana, has been
losing wetlands at a high rate. In response, both the state (Louisiana) and Fed-
eral governments have invested, and plan to continue to invest, large sums of
monies in projects aimed at reducing the rate of wetlands loss, if not reversing
it. In the long-run, commercial fishermen will benefit from such projects via
enhanced catches or a reduction in the unit cost of harvesting. Although the
beneficial effects to fishermen are delayed, government actions of this nature,
which are likely to achieve the socially desirable goal of at least partially re-
storing an ecosystem to its original condition, are subsidies to the fishermen.
As a second example, artificial reefs are, at times, made of surplus military
equipment; e.g., ships. As fish are attracted to these structures, or if their place-
18 An incidental, but potentially significant, aspect of the introduction of ITQs is that firms might in-
crease their catch of species (and even increase their capacity to catch species) they anticipate will come
under a new ITQ program. Such speculation is a rational attempt to establish a catch history that will
entitle them to greater initial quotas.
19 The argument changes, of course, if quotas are auctioned off by the government with the receipts de-
posited in the Treasury.
20 In general, the subsidy associated with the establishment of an ITQ program, or similar program limit-
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ment results in increased biomass, costs to fishermen will decline, or their ab-
solute level of catch will be enhanced. Hence, while delayed, use of surplus
equipment of this nature in the marine environment also constitutes a subsidy
according to our tentative definition.
The Effect on Fisheries of Subsidies to Other Industries
Assume, for concreteness, that subsidies are given to the agricultural sector that
result in the use of inputs (such as fertilizer) and related output in excess of that
which would be observed in the absence of such a subsidy. There are at least
two ways in which the fishing sector could be influenced by a subsidy of this
nature, far removed from the fishing sector. First, an “artificially” high level of
agricultural product, to the extent that it competes with fishery products for the
consumers’ limited food budget, reduces demand (price) for fishery products,
thereby negatively influencing capacity. Second, to the extent that agricultural
runoff increases with input usage, degradation of the marine ecosystem may ex-
ceed that which would occur in the absence of subsidies to the agricultural sec-
tor. This, too, would negatively influence capacity in the fishing sector. Thus,
the externalities resulting from the agricultural subsidy constitute a negative
subsidy to the fishery.
Subsidies to the aquaculture sector can impact the commercial marine fish-
ing industry in much the same way as those of the more general agriculture sec-
tor. First, aquaculture products compete with the commercially harvested prod-
uct in the market. Second, the feed for some aquaculture-based species, such as
salmon, is largely derived from commercially harvested species that tend to be
at a relatively low level of the marine food chain. Use of these species can po-
tentially have a negative impact on biomass and harvests of species at higher
levels. Finally, other potential negative impacts, including possible genetic deg-
radation of the wild stocks, are discussed by Naylor et al. (1998).
The World Trade Organization Definition
Before closing this discussion of factors that must be taken into account before
arriving at a suitable definition of subsidies, it is necessary to consider an im-
portant competing definition, that of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
WTO deems a subsidy to exist if a government directly transfers funds to a
company by means of grants, loans, or equity infusions; “potentially” transfers
such funds by guaranteeing loans; foregoes revenues by allowing tax credits or
waivers; provides goods or services (other than infrastructure); or offers income
or price supports. However, exempting exported products from taxes (e.g., vari-
ous forms of value-added taxes) that are applied to domestic consumption, are a
form of tax waiver that is not considered a subsidy. In addition, there is a speci-
ficity requirement that a subsidy must not be general, but must apply only to
“an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries” (GATT 1994,
pp. 264–66). This definition covers only positive subsidies specifically oriented
to a single industry or group of industries, excludes infrastructure payments,
and excludes programs that may have a more indirect effect on revenues, costs,
or profits.
The WTO, following its predecessor organization, the GATT, is concerned
with distortions in world trade that act adversely against national trading part-
ners. Subsidies on products that are not traded internationally are not actionableThalassorama 163
under the international conventions. In addition, actions against nations which
are engaged in trade distorting subsidies are only taken if a trading partner be-
lieves it is being disadvantaged by the subsidy. The WTO definition is oriented
expressly towards world trade considerations. Further, it must be recalled that
the WTO definition is operational in the sense that it specifies prohibited ac-
tions against which nations can take remedial action. Our concern is far more
general; it is with any government program that might affect the potential prof-
itability of firms in the fishery.21
Definition of “Subsidy”
In consideration of these factors, our general definition of “subsidy” is the following:
Government action (or inaction) that modifies (by increasing or decreasing) the po-
tential profits earned by the firm in the short-, medium-, or long-term.
Subsidies, then, are measured in terms of expected changes in the profits of the
industry that result from government action (or inaction), not in terms of the
cost to the government. In fact, for an action to be a subsidy, there need be no
direct cost to the government. The cost of a subsidy to government is an inter-
esting and computable variable, but is not central to the concept of “subsidy.”22
The objection might be raised that with this definition, virtually every gov-
ernment action would represent a subsidy to someone. Perhaps rightfully so.
Far too often, government policy (action) is established which fails to fully
consider ramifications to the natural resource-based sectors, such as fisheries.
These policies (actions), with few exceptions, tend to favor some parties while
disadvantaging others, and should be evaluated in this context. Such evaluation
will provide us with a richer understanding of the role of government in influ-
encing both income distribution among sectors of the fishing industry and fish-
ing capacity.
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